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T
raditionally, the costs of unemployment have
been thought of in terms of the output or
national income directly foregone.  The most
notable of these approaches is Okun’s Law, which
states that a one-percentage point increase in the
unemployment rate translates roughly into a three-
percent shortfall in output.  Approaches such as
this are incomplete for normative analysis because
they do not provide a measure of the utility losses
attributed to cyclical unemployment.  Our pro p o s e d
method for measuring these losses is based on the
notion that the unemployment rate is a measure of
general labor market risk.  Because ﬂuctuations in
the unemployment rate reﬂect changes in risk, the
cost of cyclical unemployment can be measured by
the amount that people are willing to pay to avoid it.
Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982) view genera l
labor market conditions, as re p resented by the
u n e m p l oyment ra t e, as a re g i o n - s p e c i ﬁc amenity that
is ta ken into consideration when agents make migra-
tion decisions. The sta n d a rd of living is the utility
l evel that the ave rage agent attains from the income
and amenities of a region.  If migration is frictionless:
Utility-maximizing agents are optimally located at
every point in time, the sta n d a rd of living is unifo r m
a c ross re g i o n s, and interregional income differe n t i a l s
indicate the compensating differentials paid fo r
d i f f e rences in unemployment and other amenities
(the “voting with your feet” criterion of Tiebout,
1956). There fo re, the compensating differential for a
re g i o n ’s unemployment rate can be obtained by con-
t rolling for the differences in the other amenities.1
Fo l l owing Tiebout, a large body of work has been
p roduced in the regional economics and re g i o n a l
s c ience litera t u re dealing with compensating differe n-
t i a l s, wa g e s, and migration (see Po rell, 1982, for a
partial survey).  At the same time, fo l l owing Harris
and To d a ro (1970) and Hall (1970), macro-labor e c o n-
omists have produced many papers examining the
relationships between migration, wa g e s, and unemploy -
m e n t rates (see Ghatak, Lev i n e, and Wheatley Price,
1996, for a survey).  The most recent signiﬁcant addi-
tion to this latter litera t u re is Blanchﬂower and
O s wald (1994), who have called into question a basic
result of Harris-To d a ro type models, which is that
high unemployment rates are compensated for with
higher wa g e s.
The most glaring difference between the two
a p p roaches is that the macro-labor litera t u re genera l l y
i g n o res the fact that potential migrants consider things
other than wages and unemployment.  Because of this,
the litera t u re searches for a link between those two
variables as a means of proving or disproving that
compensating differentials exist.  It is re c o g n i zed in
the regional litera t u re, howeve r, that such a link,
although interesting, proves little because wages and
u n e m p l oyment rates both can be compensated fo r
with high levels of amenities.  More importa n t l y, give n
the ongoing debate among regional economists about
the appropriateness of the assumption of sta n d a rd -
of-living equiva l e n c e, which is common to both
l i t e ra t u re s, the empirical results of both should be
v i ewed with some tre p i d a t i o n .2
Our approach fo l l ows Rosen (1979) and Ro b a c k
(1982) in considering the unemployment rate as a
re g i o n - s p e c i ﬁc amenity.  It is a departure from their
models in that we recognize the possibility that, in
the short run, frictions may prevent the optimal
allocation of agents across regions.  Because of
these frictions, differences in unemployment rates
and other amenities are not likely to be completely
compensated for, meaning that standard-of-living
equivalence does not occur at each point in time.
To account for this, we follow Greenwood, Hunt,
Rickman, and Treyz (1991) in using migration rates
to measure the extent to which the system deviates
from standard-of-living equivalence.  
In our model, the probability of a consumer
m i g rating between his present region and any other
region depends on moving costs and the sta n d a rd - o f -
living differential he perc e i ve s.  When he does migra t e,
1 Rosen and Roback do not use their models to estimate the costs of
unemployment. They include unemployment rates to control for stan-
dard-of-living differences not accounted for by differences in other
amenities.
2 See Evans (1990) and Hunt (1993) for discussions.
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it is to the region that would give him the gre a t e s t
s ta n d a rd-of-living improvement.  Because of mov i n g
c o s t s, the sta n d a rd of living differs across regions in
the short run, and high levels of unemployment will
not be compensated for with higher levels of income.
The net cro s s - m i g ration rate between any two
regions indicates the degree to which the sta n d a rd of
living differs between them, and can be used to esti-
mate the income level that would make the sta n d a rd
of living the same across re g i o n s.  
Using the above-described model, and data fo r
i n t e r p rovincial migration in Canada for 1971-90, 
we estimate the relationship between net cro s s -
m i g ration rates (re p resenting differences in sta n d a rd
of living) and differences in per-capita incomes,
u n e m p l oyment ra t e s, and other amenities.  See Le d e n t
(1990), Day (1992), and Milne (1993) for discussions
of migration in Canada.  We then use this estimated
relationship to calculate for each region the re l a t i ve
income that would have equated the actual sta n d a rd
of living and the sta n d a rd of living without cyc l i c a l
u n e m p l oyment.  This compensating differential is
what we call the cost of cyclical unemployment.  
In our model, pre f e rences towa rds the tra d e o f f
b e t ween unemployment and income are thus
revealed by the actual utility-maximizing migra t i o n
decisions of consumers.  
In principle, any level of unemployment imposes
a risk cost, re g a rdless of whether the unemploy m e n t
is cyclical or not.  Because of this, our model need
not be restricted to estimating the costs of cyc l i c a l
u n e m p l oyment, but also can be used to calculate the
cost of having a level of unemployment above any
benchmark ra t e.  As we demonstra t e, this can be
done by comparing the actual sta n d a rd of living with
the sta n d a rd of living that would have occurred had
u n e m p l oyment been at the benchmark ra t e.
The question we are addressing is similar to that
of Lucas (1987), I
.
m ro h o rog ˘lu (1989), Clark, Le s l i e,
and Symons (1994), and Dolmas (1998), who wish to
m e a s u re the costs of the business cycle in terms of
what people are willing to pay to avoid business-
cycle ﬂu c t u a t i o n s.  They use calibrated models of a
r i s k - ave rse re p re s e n ta t i ve agent to calculate the costs
of macroeconomic ﬂuctuations around trend grow t h
p a t h s.  We l fa re costs arise in these models because
the agent gets disutility from ﬂuctuations in his con-
sumption.  While our question is similar to this, it is
not compatible with theirs because their notion of
the business cyc l e, as ﬂuctuations around a trend, is
d i f f e rent from our more traditional notion based on
cyclical unemployment.  Ad d i t i o n a l l y, in our model,
individual uncertainty about employment pro s p e c t s
exists even in the absence of aggregate uncerta i n t y.
In this paper, Section I presents the model and
Section II describes the data, estimation methods,
and re g ression re s u l t s.  We calculate the reve a l e d
costs of cyclical unemployment and the levels of
u n e m p l oyment in Section III, and in Section IV we
p resent our conclusions. 
THE MODEL
Assume that an individual’s assessment of the
standard of living in a region has two components,
one that is commonly held, and another that is
individual-speciﬁc.  Speciﬁcally, individual k’s
assessment of the standard of living he would
attain at region i is
( 1 )
w h e re the function v ( . ) is “the” sta n d a rd of living at
region i, Ui is the unemployment ra t e, Yi is the per-
c a p i ta income at i, and Ai is a ve c tor of amenities,
which includes a l l c o n s i d e rations other than income
and unemployment.  The stochastic term ei
k c a p t u re s
the extent to which individual k’s assessment of
region i d i f f e rs from the common assessment. 
If we actually knew the sta n d a rd of living for each
region, we could simply estimate the importance of
each of the arguments in v ( . ).  With this estimate, we
could calculate the cost of any level of unemploy m e n t
in terms of lost sta n d a rd of living, or, instead, ex p re s s
the cost in terms of the income that would compen-
sate for the level of unemployment.  The obvious
p roblem with this is that it is impossible to know any
re g i o n ’s sta n d a rd of living.  So, instead, we use the
methodology developed by Greenwood, et al.
(1991), who use migration data to estimate re l a t i ve
s ta n d a rd of living.  Their empirical model is based
on their assumption that a region’s net migration
rate measures the extent to which its standard of
living differs from that of the nation:
w h e re Mi j is the number of people who migrate fro m
region ito region j, Niis the population of region i, and
v 2 is the sta n d a rd of living for the nation as a whole.  
The problem with Gre e nwood, et al.’s methodology
is that actual potential migrants compare their curre n t
region to each of the potential destinations, ra t h e r




= v - vi ;
Vi
k = v( Ai,U i ,Yi )+ ei
k
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than to the national ave ra g e.  Thus, it is the c ro s s-
m i g ration decisions between two regions that prov i d e
the appropriate information about pre f e re n c e s, not
the net in-migration ra t e.  Because of this, we use the
ve rsion of the Gre e nwood, et al. method deve l o p e d
by Douglas (1997), Douglas and Wall (2000), and Wa l l
(2000).  In this ve rsion, it is the expected net cro s s -
m i g ration rate between two regions that is an
i n c reasing function of the sta n d a rd-of-living differe n-
tial.  Also, the appropriate cro s s - m i g ration rate ta ke s
account of the number of migration o p p o r t u n i t i e s i n
potential destination re g i o n s, as proxied for by the
destination re g i o n ’s population.  The sta n d a rd - o f -
living differential between two regions there fo re is
m e a s u red by a gravity-type net cro s s - m i g ration rate: 
( 2 )
For purposes of estimation, specify the sta n d a rd -
of-living function as
( 3 )
w h e re  and  a re positive consta n t s.  From this, the
d i f f e rence in the sta n d a rd of living between the two
regions is
( 4 )
Substitute equation 2 into equation 4 and allow fo r
m e a s u rement and other error to obta i n
( 5 )
w h e re li ;  ¢1nAi, the utility value of amenities.
As mentioned above, the basic methodology of
using migration rates to estimate sta n d a rd - o f - l i v i n g
d i f f e rentials fo l l ows from Gre e nwood, et al. (1991 ) ,
Douglas and Wall (2000), and Wall (2000).  Because
we wish to separate the effect of labor-market condi-
tions from that of other amenities, we expand the
methodology by including the re l a t i ve unemploy m e n t
rate as a right-hand-side va r i a b l e.  This fo l l ows Ro s e n
(1979) and Roback (1982), who viewed the unemploy-
m e n t rate as a re g i o n - s p e c i ﬁc amenity.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Data and Estimation
The best country to apply our model to is Canada.
Not only are the migration and other data of very
high quality, but, more importantly for our present
purposes, reliable estimates of provincial noncyc l i c a l
rates of unemployment are readily ava i l a b l e.  Cro s s -
m i g ration data are from the To tal Migration Series
f rom Statistics Canada 1971-90, as calculated fro m
census ﬁg u res and Family Allowance accounts.  The
m i g ration data go back to 1950, but as reported by
S tatistics Canada, they are much more reliable after
1 9 70.  Real per-capita provincial income is calculated
using provincial price indices.  
In implementing equation 5, we allow amenity
values to change every ﬁve ye a rs.  It is possible to
a l l ow amenities to vary more fre q u e n t l y, but doing so
would increase the variability of the estimates.  Let Z
denote the number of periods over which the ameni-
ties are ﬁxed, and P the number of prov i n c e s.  There
is one observation per-year per unique pair of
p rov i n c e s, for a to tal of Z P ( P - 1 ) / 2=900 observa t i o n s,
each containing the log of real re l a t i ve income ln(Y j/Y i) ,
the log of re l a t i ve unemployment ln(Ui/Uj), and a set
of discrete variables that identify the prov i n c e s.  The
d i s c rete variables are necessary to estimate re l a t i ve
a m e n i t i e s, and consist of one discrete variable fo r
each province for each ﬁve - year period.  Within its
c o r responding ﬁve - year period, each discrete va r i a b l e
has the value of 1 if the province is province i, -1 if
the province is province j, and ze ro otherwise.  We
avoid singularity by imposing the restriction that the
ls sum to ze ro for each ﬁve - year period, meaning
that the amenity estimates are re l a t i ve to ze ro .
The re g ression results are summarized by
Ta b l e 1.  The coefﬁcients on real income and unem-
p l oyment are positive and statistically different fro m
ze ro.  Note that ^ . ^ ( i . e., the sta n d a rd of living is
m o re re s p o n s i ve to a change in re l a t i ve income than
to a change in re l a t i ve unemploy m e n t ) .
Estimated Amenities
Although our primary focus here is to estimate
the costs of unemployment, our model can be used
to calculate the re l a t i ve values of other amenities
Mij -M ji
NiN j













ç  ç 
ö 
ø 
÷  ÷ +hij;
v j - vi = ¢ ln j - ln i ( )+ g lnY j - lnYi ( )
+d lnUi - lnUj ( ).
v( A i,Ui ,Yi ) = ¢lnAi + g lnYi +d lnUi ;
Mij - M ji
NiN j
= v j - vi .
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a c ross prov i n c e s.  Refer to Ta b le1and note that l ^. 0
indicates that the utility value of amenities (exc l u s i ve
of the unemployment rate) was higher than the
national ave ra g e, and vice ve rsa.  The provinces are
listed in order of the value of their amenities.  See
Douglas and Wall (2000) for the use of these re s u l t s
to rank the provinces by to tal sta n d a rd of living.
THE REVEALED COST 
OF UNEMPLOYMENT
Cyclical Unemployment
In this section, we calculate the amount of income
that people would be willing to give up in return fo r
h aving no cyclical unemployment.  Deﬁne the non-
cyclical sta n d a rd-of-living in province jas the sta n d a rd
of living that would prevail if the unemployment ra t e
is at the noncyclical rate U¢ j, and if per-capita income
we re Yj.  The noncyclical sta n d a rd of living is then
( 6 )
Substituting the estimated para m e t e rs ^ and ^, the
re l a t i ve income that would be re q u i red to equate the
n o n cyclical sta n d a rd of living and the actual
s ta n d a rd of living, RY*
j ; Y¢ j /Yj, can be obtained fro m :
( 7 )
If a province’s actual unemployment rate is
g reater than the noncyclical ra t e, then  RY*
j is less than
o n e.  The rate at which Y¢ j is less than actual income
is the amount of income that people would be
willing to give up to have no cyclical unemploy m e n t ,
which is what we call the cost of cyclical unemploy-
m e n t . Thus, the cost of cyclical unemployment 
is Ljt ;12RY*
jt for province j in year t.  Aggregation
of these costs across provinces and over time is
straightforward, and is described in the appendix.
The next step is to ﬁnd appropriate measures of U¢ j
to substitute into equation 7.  We use two possible
measures to give us the lower and upper bounds of
the costs of cyclical unemployment.
Lower limit of the costs of cyclical unemploy m e n t .
In this subsection we calculate the costs of cyc l i c a l
u n e m p l oyment using estimates of prov i n c i a l
ˆ  g lnRY j
*+ˆ  d ln
U j
¢  U j
æ 
è 
ç  ç 
ö 
ø 
÷  ÷ = 0.
¢  v  j = l j +g ln ¢  Y  j -d ln ¢  U j.
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Regression Re s u l t s
l SE t
1971-75
Prince Edward Island 1.61 0.18 9.00
Newfoundland 1.39 0.17 8.27
New Brunswick 0.85 0.12 7.02
Nova Scotia 0.48 0.10 4.65
Alberta –0.21 0.11 –1.89
British Columbia –0.36 0.17 –2.13
Quebec –0.37 0.10 –3.55
Manitoba –0.84 0.10 –8.86
Saskatchewan –0.94 0.13 –7.19
Ontario –1.61 0.20 –8.17
1976-80
Newfoundland 1.17 0.16 7.40
Prince Edward Island 1.02 0.16 6.39
New Brunswick 0.89 0.13 6.91
Nova Scotia 0.68 0.11 6.22
Alberta –0.31 0.14 –2.19
Saskatchewan –0.38 0.13 –3.06
Quebec –0.46 0.12 –3.78
British Columbia –0.54 0.16 –3.35
Manitoba –0.77 0.10 –7.83
Ontario –1.29 0.16 –8.00
1981-85
Newfoundland 1.19 0.17 6.93
Prince Edward Island 1.08 0.16 6.70
New Brunswick 0.92 0.12 7.42
Nova Scotia 0.77 0.10 7.53
Quebec –0.28 0.10 –2.71
Manitoba –0.45 0.09 –4.74
Saskatchewan –0.49 0.11 –4.43
British Columbia –0.61 0.14 –4.26
Ontario –0.99 0.15 –6.45
Alberta –1.15 0.15 –7.87
1986-90
Newfoundland 0.96 0.14 6.70
Prince Edward Island 0.84 0.13 6.62
New Brunswick 0.72 0.11 6.73
Nova Scotia 0.58 0.09 6.50
British Columbia 0.03 0.12 0.23
Quebec –0.26 0.09 –2.83
Manitoba –0.42 0.09 –4.55
Saskatchewan –0.46 0.11 –4.21
Alberta –0.72 0.12 –6.01
Ontario –1.26 0.16 –7.91
Real income ( ) 4.07 0.62 6.62
Unemployment ( ) 0.82 0.16 5.28
R
2 = 0.319
Table 1n o n cyclical unemployment rates for each year fro m
1 9 71-86, ta ken from Burns (1991) and reported in
Table 2.  As described by Burns, his estimates of the
n o n cyclical rates are based on what would be ex p e c t e d
in the steady sta t e.  The Canadian unemploy m e n t
experience over this period is summarized by Figure 1.
The estimated national steady-state unemploy m e n t
in Canada ranged between 6 and 7 percent during
the 1970 s, and rose to around 8 percent during the
early 1980s.  For all ye a rs but 1973 and 1974, cyc l i c a l
u n e m p l oyment was positive at the national leve l .
The provincial noncyclical ra t e s, re p roduced in Ta b l e
3, varied greatly across Canada during this period.
Table 3 presents the cost of cyclical unemploy-
ment as a perc e n tage of provincial income for each
p rovince for each year (Lj t).  The bottom row is each
p rov i n c e ’s cost as a percent of income over the
e n t i re time period (Lj), and the last column is 
the aggregate cost for Canada for each year (Lt) .
The bottom right-hand corner is the to tal cost of
cyclical unemployment for Canada for the period
1 9 71-86 (L) .
C yclical unemployment was most costly fo r
O n tario, 4.7 percent of provincial income over the
period.  The provinces with the lowest costs of
cyclical unemployment we re New Brunswick, New-
foundland, Nova Scotia, and Saska tc h ewan; 0.7 to 1.1
p e rcent of provincial income.  This was achieved in
S a s ka tc h ewan with low steady-state unemploy m e n t
and low actual unemployment, whereas the other
t h ree had high levels of both, but with little
d i f f e rence between them.  For the remaining ﬁve
p rovinces the cost of cyclical unemployment wa s
b e t ween 2.2 and 3.2 percent of provincial income.  
For Canada as a whole, yearly costs of cyc l i c a l
u n e m p l oyment we re low during the early 1970 s,
rose to a peak of 7.9 percent of national income in
1983, and fell to 4.2 percent by 1986.  For the entire
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P rovincial Noncyclical Rates of Unemployment; Burns (1991)
Alb. B.C. Man. N.B. Nﬂ. N.S. Ont. PEI Que. Sas. Canada
1971 5.4 7.3 5.4 6.1 9.4 6.4 4.9 7.1 7.1 3.5 5.9
1972 5.5 7.3 5.2 8.5 9.9 7.0 4.9 8.4 7.0 4.3 6.0
1973 5.0 6.1 4.7 7.9 9.9 7.6 5.1 8.4 7.0 3.6 5.9
1974 4.1 7.0 4.1 9.3 14.3 8.1 5.1 8.6 7.6 2.6 6.1
1975 3.5 8.9 4.5 11.1 14.4 8.6 5.4 8.7 8.2 3.6 6.7
1976 4.2 9.0 5.2 11.1 15.6 8.7 5.7 9.1 8.7 3.8 7.0
1977 4.2 8.4 5.8 11.5 15.6 9.4 5.7 9.3 8.9 4.5 7.1
1978 4.0 7.3 5.2 10.2 14.4 9.3 5.6 8.9 8.7 4.1 6.8
1979 3.5 5.8 4.5 10.7 12.9 9.6 5.4 8.7 8.3 3.9 6.3
1980 3.2 5.6 4.8 11.3 12.5 9.4 5.3 9.2 8.8 3.8 6.3
1981 4.2 8.7 5.9 12.1 15.6 10.4 5.7 10.0 9.7 5.4 7.4
1982 6.9 11.5 7.1 13.5 16.2 11.7 6.6 11.1 10.5 6.4 8.7
1983 8.6 10.0 7.1 14.1 16.3 12.1 6.1 11.6 9.8 6.9 8.4
1984 8.4 11.1 6.8 14.2 18.4 12.2 6.2 11.6 9.8 7.1 8.6
1985 8.5 11.3 7.1 13.6 18.1 12.3 6.1 11.8 9.8 7.5 8.6
1986 8.1 10.5 6.4 12.5 16.9 11.4 5.6 11.0 8.5 6.6 7.8
Table 2
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period of 1971-86, the costs of cyclical unemploy m e n t
we re 3.3 percent of national income.  
Upper limit of the costs of cyclical unemploy m e n t.
T h e re is a potential problem with using estimates of
the noncyclical unemployment that are based on
what should occur in the steady sta t e, as we have
done above.  When there is unemployment hys t e re s i s,
an increase in cyclical unemployment can cause
the steady-state level of unemployment to rise.3 I f
c u r rent cyclical unemployment increases future
s t e a d y - s tate ra t e s, then the use of steady-sta t e
u n e m p l oyment rates suppresses the effect that past
u n e m p l oyment has on current risk.  Because of
t h i s, we must eliminate the possible effects that the
actual unemployment rates may have had on steady-
s tate ra t e s.
In order to obtain an upper limit on the costs 
of unemployment over the period, we assume that
all changes in the steady-state rates estimated by
Burns (1991) are attributed to hysteresis.  Thus, to
eliminate the effect that the unemployment history
may have had on the steady-state unemployment
rates, we use the estimates of the steady-state rates
for 1971 as the noncyclical unemployment rate for
the entire period.  These estimates of the costs of
cyclical unemployment are presented in Table 4.
Note that the sums of the upper limits of costs of
cyclical unemployment are for 1971-86 only, so that
t h ey are comparable to the lower limits calculated
a b ove.  The difference between the upper and lowe r
limits are greatest for the Maritime Prov i n c e s, where
the increases in the steady-state unemployment ra t e s
we re quite larg e.  Only for Alberta, Manitoba, and
O n tario are the upper limits not more than twice the
l ower limits.  For Canada as a whole, when all
changes in the steady-state unemployment rates are
attributed to the unemployment histo r y, the costs of
cyclical unemployment between 1971 and 1986 wa s
7.4 percent of national income.
S u m m a r y.  Another way of interpreting the costs of
cyclical unemployment is to call them the beneﬁt s
that would accrue from policies that eliminated cyc l i-
cal unemployment.  If these policies also have the
effect of slowing down growth, it is useful to know
the grow t h - u n e m p l oyment tradeoff to see if the poli-
cies would have been wo r t h w h i l e.  For Canada
b e t ween 1971 and 1986, in which real growth ave r-
L ower Limits of the Costs of Cyclical Unemployment, as a Pe rc e n t age of Income
N o n cyclical unemployment rates = steady–state rates from Burns (1991)
Alb. B.C. Man. N.B. Nﬂ. N.S. Ont. PEI Que. Sas. Canada
1971 0.8 –0.2 1.1 –0.3 –2.3 1.8 2.0 5.7 0.6 0.5 1.1
1972 0.5 1.5 0.9 –3.6 –1.3 –0.3 0.5 5.7 1.3 0.5 0.7
1973 0.8 1.9 –0.3 –0.2 0.0 –2.7 –3.2 1.8 –0.8 –0.9 –1.4
1974 –3.4 –2.6 –2.1 –4.2 –1.6 –3.7 –2.8 0.4 –2.9 1.8 –2.7
1975 3.8 –0.9 0.3 –2.3 –0.5 –2.0 3.5 1.4 –0.3 –4.9 1.3
1976 –1.2 –1.0 –1.9 0.0 –3.0 1.6 1.7 1.0 –0.1 0.7 0.4
1977 1.3 0.3 0.8 3.0 0.0 2.5 4.1 1.2 3.0 –0.3 2.7
1978 3.3 2.5 4.9 4.2 2.5 2.5 5.2 2.0 4.6 3.6 4.4
1979 2.5 5.9 3.6 0.6 3.4 1.1 3.9 5.1 2.9 1.4 3.5
1980 3.4 3.9 2.6 –0.5 1.3 0.8 5.4 2.9 2.3 3.1 3.7
1981 –1.9 –5.0 0.1 –1.0 –2.5 –0.4 2.9 2.3 1.4 –3.1 0.5
1982 2.2 1.2 3.5 0.7 0.7 2.3 8.1 3.1 5.7 –1.0 5.1
1983 4.4 6.7 5.8 1.0 2.9 1.7 12.0 1.2 7.3 1.1 7.9
1984 5.8 6.0 4.4 1.0 2.0 1.3 8.0 1.9 5.6 2.6 6.2
1985 3.4 4.6 2.9 2.1 2.8 2.1 5.5 2.5 4.0 1.5 4.3
1986 3.9 3.6 3.8 2.7 2.7 2.9 4.3 4.1 5.2 3.0 4.2
Sum 2.4 2.2 2.4 0.7 0.9 1.1 4.7 2.6 3.2 0.8 3.3
Table 3
3 See Lindbeck and Snower (1986) and Laya rd, Nickell, and Jackman (1991 ) .MA RC H/ AP R I L 2000    7
aged 3.6 percent a ye a r, a growth rate that was 0.4-
0.8 percent higher in each year would have genera t-
ed enough income to compensate for the 3.3-7.4
p e rcent costs of cyclical unemployment.  In other
wo rd s, the social beneﬁt of eliminating cyclical ﬂu c-
tuations of unemployment during this period wo u l d
h ave been the same as the social beneﬁt of having a
g rowth rate that was 0.4-0.8 percent higher in each
ye a r.  Real growth in Canada ave raged 4.6 percent a
year from 1950 to 1970.  If growth from 1971 to
1986 had kept up with this ra t e, even the upper limit
of the costs of cyclical unemployment would have
been compensated fo r.  
A ny complete discussion of our results must
keep in mind that the results are very sensitive to the
time period examined.  We selected our time period
because the migration data are much more re l i a b l e
after 1970, and because the most recent estimates
we have of the natural rate for all the provinces are
f rom 1986.  Adding ye a rs to the beginning or the end
of our period would lower the estimated to tal costs,
and also lower the additional growth that would have
compensated for the costs.  For insta n c e, simply by
including 1987-90 in calculating the upper limit of
the costs of cyclical unemployment, the compen-
s a tory growth per year falls to 0.6 percent.  In addi-
tion, because the ye a rs 1971-86 have been the most
economically turbulent ye a rs in post-war Canada,
our estimates of the costs of cyclical unemploy m e n t
over the period are higher than for other periods.  
We should also keep in mind that policy m a ke rs may
h ave already learned lessons from the period, and
that the likelihood of a repetition of the re ﬂa t i o n /
d e ﬂation cycle of the late 1970s and early 1980s may
be low.  Howeve r, with policymaking being what it is,
we should not count on this being true.
U n e m p l oyment Leve l s
Another way of looking at the costs of unem-
p l oyment is that there is some benchmark level of
u n e m p l oyment that is viewed subjectively as desir-
able or optimal.  An unemployment rate above this
benchmark level is socially suboptimal and there fo re
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of ST. LOUIS
Upper Limits of the Costs of Cyclical Unemployment, as a Pe rc e n t age of Income
Alb. B.C. Man. N.B. Nﬂ. N.S. Ont. PEI Que. Sas. Canada
1971 0.8 –0.2 1.1 –0.3 –2.3 1.8 2.0 5.7 0.6 0.5 1.1
1972 0.9 1.6 0.2 3.2 –0.2 1.7 0.4 9.5 1.1 5.1 1.0
1973 –0.8 –1.7 –2.9 5.3 1.2 0.7 –2.6 5.5 –1.0 0.0 –1.5
1974 –8.6 –3.3 –7.5 4.3 7.1 1.2 –2.0 4.6 –1.5 –4.1 –2.4
1975 –5.3 3.2 –3.3 10.0 8.5 4.1 5.4 5.9 2.7 –4.1 3.0
1976 –6.1 3.2 –2.7 13.0 7.5 8.3 4.8 6.4 4.1 2.6 3.5
1977 –3.7 3.1 2.2 17.0 11.0 11.0 7.4 7.0 7.9 5.2 6.2
1978 –2.8 2.6 4.1 16.0 12.0 11.0 8.1 6.9 9.0 6.9 6.9
1979 –6.5 0.9 0.0 13.0 10.0 9.8 5.9 9.8 6.2 3.5 4.3
1980 –7.3 –1.6 0.4 13.0 7.3 8.9 6.9 8.6 6.8 4.8 4.4
1981 –6.8 –1.6 1.9 14.0 8.1 9.9 6.1 9.8 8.0 6.1 4.5
1982 7.4 11.0 9.6 18.0 12.0 16.0 15.0 13.0 14.0 12.0 13.0
1983 15.0 14.0 12.0 20.0 15.0 16.0 16.0 12.0 15.0 16.0 15.0
1984 16.0 15.0 9.4 20.0 17.0 16.0 13.0 13.0 13.0 18.0 14.0
1985 13.0 14.0 8.9 20.0 17.0 17.0 10.0 14.0 11.0 19.0 12.0
1986 13.0 11.0 7.5 19.0 16.0 16.0 7.3 14.0 9.3 17.0 9.8
1987 12.0 10.0 6.6 17.0 14.0 14.0 4.4 14.0 7.8 16.0 7.9
1988 8.1 7.3 7.8 15.0 12.0 9.9 0.4 13.0 5.8 17.0 4.9
1989 5.9 4.5 7.2 16.0 11.0 9.3 0.7 15.0 5.7 17.0 4.4
1990 5.4 2.6 6.2 15.0 13.0 11.0 5.2 16.0 7.5 15.0 6.3
Sum 3.0 5.8 3.9 15.0 11.0 11.0 7.9 9.9 8.1 8.7 7.4
Table 48 MA RC H/ AP R I L 2000   
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imposes costs on society.  Thus, the cost of unem-
p l oyment can be viewed as the cost of it being above
some acceptable benchmark level.  The method
described above can be adapted easily to include
these other costs of unemployment.  Note that our
calculations are not net of the costs of achieving the
benchmark ra t e s.
Substitute any benchmark unemployment rate
for U¢ j in equation 7, and the interpretation of Lit
becomes the percent of provincial income that
people would be willing to pay to have the bench-
mark unemployment rate.  In other words, it is the
cost of having unemployment above the benchmark
rate.  Compared to the calculation of the costs of
cyclical unemployment, the only difference here 
is that if a province’s actual unemployment is
lower than the benchmark rate, then the cost of
unemployment is zero.
The selection of a benchmark unemploy m e n t
rate is completely subjective.  There are many
d i f f e rent views about what the “desira b l e,” “optimal,”
or “minimally acceptable” level of unemployment is.
Without apologies, the arbitrary unemploy m e n t
benchmark that we chose for each province for each
year is 6 percent.  The costs of unemployment above
this benchmark are presented in Table 5.  Although it
is perfectly reasonable to believe that the desira b l e
u n e m p l oyment rate is different for provinces and
a c ross time, we leave this calculation to the re a d e r.
Note that in Table 5, the to tal costs over time are cal-
culated for the ye a rs 1971-86, so that they are
c o m p a rable to the to tal costs calculated in Tables 3
and 4.
As indicated by Table 5, the costs of hav i n g
u n e m p l oyment above 6 percent during 1971 - 8 6
varied widely across prov i n c e s.  For British Columbia,
N ew Brunswick, New foundland, Nova Scotia, Prince
E d wa rd Island, and Quebec, the costs we re above 10
p e rcent of provincial income.  Saska tc h ewan and
M a n i toba, on the other hand, had costs of only 1.8
and 3.0 percent, re s p e c t i ve l y.  For Canada as a whole,
the cost of having unemployment above 6 perc e n t
was lowest during 1973-74, peaked at 14 perc e n t
during 1983, and was 7.5 percent of national income
Costs of Having Unemployment Above 6 Pe rcent, as a Pe rc e n t age of Income
Alb. B.C. Man. N.B. Nﬂ. N.S. Ont. PEI Que Sas. Canada
1971 0.0 3.8 0.0 0.0 7.0 3.0 0.0 9.2 4.0 0.0 1.7
1972 0.0 5.7 0.0 3.4 9.2 2.9 0.0 13.0 4.5 0.0 2.1
1973 0.0 2.3 0.0 5.6 11.0 1.9 0.0 9.0 2.4 0.0 1.2
1974 0.0 0.6 0.0 4.6 17.0 2.5 0.0 8.1 1.8 0.0 1.0
1975 0.0 7.4 0.0 11.0 19.0 5.3 1.2 9.4 6.2 0.0 3.6
1976 0.0 7.4 0.0 13.0 18.0 9.6 0.6 9.9 7.7 0.0 4.0
1977 0.0 7.3 0.0 17.0 21.0 12.0 3.1 11.0 12.0 0.0 6.2
1978 0.0 6.7 1.8 16.0 22.0 12.0 3.8 10.0 13.0 0.0 6.8
1979 0.0 5.0 0.0 13.0 21.0 11.0 1.6 13.0 9.8 0.0 4.7
1980 0.0 2.4 0.0 13.0 17.0 10.0 2.6 12.0 11.0 0.0 4.9
1981 0.0 2.3 0.0 14.0 18.0 11.0 1.9 13.0 12.0 0.0 4.9
1982 5.2 15.0 7.2 19.0 23.0 17.0 10.0 17.0 18.0 0.4 13.0
1983 12.0 18.0 9.6 20.0 26.0 17.0 12.0 16.0 19.0 4.1 14.0
1984 13.0 20.0 6.9 20.0 28.0 17.0 8.6 17.0 17.0 6.1 13.0
1985 11.0 19.0 6.5 21.0 29.0 18.0 6.0 18.0 15.0 6.2 11.0
1986 10.0 16.0 5.1 19.0 27.0 17.0 3.0 18.0 13.0 5.1 9.0
1987 10.0 15.0 4.2 17.0 25.0 16.0 0.2 17.0 12.0 4.3 7.2
1988 5.9 12.0 5.4 15.0 23.0 11.0 0.0 17.0 9.5 4.8 5.6
1989 3.7 8.7 4.8 16.0 22.0 11.0 0.0 19.0 9.3 4.6 5.0
1990 3.2 6.7 3.9 15.0 24.0 12.0 0.9 20.0 11.0 3.2 5.6
Sum 4.7 10.0 3.0 15.0 21.0 12.0 4.2 14.0 12.0 1.8 7.5
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over the period.  Additional growth of 0.6 percent a
year would have compensated for these costs.
C ON C LU S I ON S
The problem with existing methods of measuring
the costs of unemployment is that they are not par-
ticularly useful for normative policy analys i s.  Their
focus is on the output that is fo regone when there 
is unemployment, instead of on the utility losses 
that result from unemployment.  In contrast, we 
p ropose an approach that yields estimates of the 
utility costs of unemployment as measured by the
amount that people would be willing to pay to avo i d
the risk of unemployment.  Under the assumptions
of our model, the difference in the sta n d a rd of living
b e t ween two regions is equal to the difference in the
rates of cross migration.  We then estimate the ex t e n t
to which income, unemployment, and other ameni-
ties contribute to differences in the sta n d a rd of living.
Using these estimates, we calculate the amount o f
income that people would be willing to pay in ord e r to
avoid the possibility of unemployment.  We estimate
the cost of cyclical unemployment in Canada fro m
1 9 71 to 1986 to have been between 3.3 and 7.4 per-
cent of national income over the period.  Ad d i t i o n a l
g rowth of 0.4 to 0.8 percent per year would have
g e n e rated enough income to have compensated fo r
these costs.
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As a perc e n tage of national income, the to tal 
cost of cyclical unemployment in year t over the P
provinces of Canada is
w h e re Nj t is province j’s population in year t.  
For combining costs over time, we simply use the
s h a re of all income generated over the entire period
that would have compensated for the costs of
cyclical unemployment.  So, the cost of cyc l i c a l
u n e m p l oyment for province j over any T ye a rs is
F i n a l l y, the to tal costs of cyclical unemploy m e n t
in Canada over the entire time period is obtained by
summing the numera tor and denominator of the

































































AGGREGATING THE PROVINCIAL COSTS OF UNEMPLOYMENT